On 24 March 2020, the Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020 received Royal Assent, meaning that the changes proposed in that bill to "lessen the threat of insolvency" for individuals and businesses in the current coronavirus pandemic have now become law. The changes will be in place for a period of six months starting from today and ending on 25 September 2020, unless this grace period is extended in the future.

By way of summary, the legislative changes involve the following measures:

On 4 February 2020, the Federal Court of Australia considered the circumstances in which it might be said that a provisional liquidator of a company ought not be appointed as the official liquidator because of an alleged "reasonable apprehension of bias". The issue was ventilated before the Court in the matter of  Frisken (as receiver of Avant Garde Investments Pty Ltd v Cheema [2020] FCA 98.

Appointing a provisional liquidator

Entering into liquidation can be a scary time for any company and its officers, even one which chooses to do so voluntarily. However, the directors, shareholders and creditors of a company entering into liquidation do not have absolute discretion as to who they may appoint as the liquidator of the company. Together, the Corporations Act and common law principles of independence regulate the eligibility of a liquidator to be appointed to a company, and to remain in the appointment.

Overarching eligibility

In the recent decision of Boensch as Trustee of the Boensch Trust v Scott Darren Pascoe [2019] HCA 49, the High Court has clarified whether property held by a bankrupt on trust for another vests in the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, and the circumstances in which a trustee in bankruptcy will have reasonable cause to lodge a caveat to protect an interest in the trust property.

Background

In the recent decision of In the matter of Parkway One Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1495 (Parkway), Rees J dismissed an application to terminate the winding up of Parkway One Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company) due to inconclusive evidence as to the solvency of the Company and, having regard to the non-compliance by its director of her statutory duties and the likelihood of the Company not being able to service the current and foreseen indebtedness, her Honour held that it would be contrary to commercial morality to terminate the wi

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

Receiverships usually arise from a secured creditor exercising their rights under a loan contract or mortgage following a default. But even where no default occurs, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to preserve the property of an association pending the resolution of a dispute about the management of the association’s property.

Jurisdiction

In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background